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This essay aims at throwing new light on a decades-long controversy over the intel-
lectual relation between Weber and Schmitt. This debate over time has been charac-
terized by polar positions, with the “Weberians” who exclude any continuity
10 between the theorist of Wertfreiheit and the Kronjurist of the Third Reich; and those
who not only emphasize similarities, but also a true intellectual ﬁliation between
them. Without denying legitimacy to these interpretations, I shall argue that the sim-
ilarities as well as the differences between Weber and Schmitt are to be found and
located in the larger context of the crisis of modernity. Both theorists lived and wit-
15 nessed the dilemmas caused by the process of rationalization, the neutralization of
politics, the technocracy it entailed, and the emergence of a secular polytheism of
values. The crisis of modernity – and of political mediation – is the background
against which these two thinkers have shaped their conceptual tools but, as I shall
explain, the intellectual weapons they used to address this epochal crisis are differ-
20 ent. Between the Weberian “ethics of responsibility” and the Schmittian “neutraliza-
tion of values,” there is an abyss crossed by an ideology: the political.
Keywords: Max Weber; Carl Schmitt; theory of values; disenchantment; philosophy
of history; political theology
25 Evil is the starry sky of the Good.1
Kafka (1917/1992, p. 57)
Violence has been the sire of all the world’s values.
Jeffers (1941/2011, p. 563)
Introduction
30 Every new world view arises from a spatio-cultural revolution as well as any thinker is
intimately linked to the ethos of his age. Max Weber and Carl Schmitt probably would
have shared this vision, convinced as they were of the non-universality of human
sciences and of the radical historicity of concepts and ideas.2 This conception of intel-
lectual history could also be used to penetrate the epochal background against which
35 the complex relationship between these scholars has gained insights and momentum.
Rationalization and disenchantment, secularization and neutralization, theology and
theodicy, legality and legitimacy, charisma and katechon; all these conceptual pairs
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represent, in fact, the leitmotivs of Weber’s and Schmitt’s analyses and lead to a com-
mon origin: the crisis of Western rationalism.3 Nonetheless, it would be forced to draw
5the conclusion that Schmitt “was a ‘legitimate pupil’ of Weber’s” or that his work rep-
resents a “response of a political thinker to an economist” (Colliot Thélène, 1999,
p. 142; Habermas, 1971, p. 66). In the ﬁrst case, one underestimates the overall con-
text, the crisis of modernity and the cultural and political horizon from which both Sch-
mitt and Weber drawn their themes. The second argument emphasizes personalism,
10reducing the boundaries of the mundus imaginalis that lies beyond their analyses. I
believe, therefore, to be methodologically sound to explore Weber’s and Schmitt’s intel-
lectual apparatuses not only on the basis of the problems they faced but, above all, via
the solutions they elaborated to those challenges, trying to apprehend their “imaginative
background.”
15Following this approach, this essay aims at throwing new light on a decades-long
controversy over the intellectual relation between Weber and Schmitt.4 This debate has
been characterized by polar positions, with the “Weberians” who exclude any continuity
between the theorist of Wertfreiheit and the Kronjurist of the Third Reich (cf. Topitsch,
1971, p. 19); and those who not only emphasize similarities, but also a true intellectual
20ﬁliation between them (Lukács, 1980, pp. 652–661). Without denying legitimacy to
these interpretations, I shall argue that the similarities between Weber and Schmitt are to
be found and located in the larger context of the crisis of modernity. Both theorists lived
and witnessed the dilemmas caused by the process of rationalization, the neutralization
of politics, the technocracy it entailed, and the emergence of a secular polytheism of val-
25ues. However, while for Weber the age of disenchantment represents the end of any pos-
sible ideological unity of the world and, in turn, its reversal in a renewed secular
polytheism; for Schmitt, this crisis reveals the origin of politics – i.e. the political that,
according to him, becomes the ultimate all-encompassing force.
Colliot-Thélène (1999, pp. 138–141) has suggested three analytical facets of con-
30frontation between these scholars: positivization of law, the theory of values, rationaliza-
tion and the genesis of modernity.5 I think it is particularly relevant to engage with the
second line of comparison. Firstly, the link between Weber’s theory of values and
Schmitt’s Tyranny of Values (1960/2011) has not been fully explored.6 Secondly, “the
theory of values” represents a sort of intellectual testament of these two scholars; indeed,
35it contains their ultimate conceptual effort through which they tried to rethink the
problems of disenchantment and the nihilism it entails. In this sense, the “discourse on
values” is also an extreme synthesis of the other two facets of analysis. Finally,
Schmitt’s (1960/2011, p. 42) essay is the most explicitly “Weberian,” the one in which
he acknowledges “Weber’s intellectual honesty” [Webers intellektuelle Redlichkeit]
40and the similarities as well as the differences between these authors emerge most
forcefully.
Comparing Weber and Schmitt on this conceptual ground, I intend to show how
they stand on different “vocational” sides. If, indeed, for Weber (1946, p. 153), the
only possibility “in a time without god and prophet” is to take “responsibility before
45history”7 and, therefore, commensurate one own actions on the basis of an adequate
individual ethics; Schmitt, on the contrary, believes that behind this Krise lies entropy
and violence, the latter being the substantial source of the social life that can change
form but cannot be removed from “the normative order of the earth.” This is the rift
that separates the atheist theorist of The Protestant Ethic from the Catholic author of
50Politische Theologie. The crisis of modernity – and of political mediation – is the back-
ground against which these two thinkers have shaped their conceptual tools but, as I
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shall explain, the intellectual weapons they used to address this epochal crisis are
different. Between the Weberian “ethics of responsibility” and the Schmittian “neutral-
ization of values,” there is an abyss crossed by an ideology: the political.
5 Reducing polarity: the Weber–Schmitt controversy
The controversy over the intellectual relation between Weber and Schmitt has old roots
which can be traced back to late April 1964 when – during the Fifteenth Convention of
the German Sociological Association held in Heidelberg in honor of Weber’s centenary
– a young Habermas (1971, p. 66) notoriously stigmatized Schmitt as a “legitimate
10 pupil” of Weber. This view was shared by Lukács (1980, p. 652), one of Weber’s old
fellow scholars and frequent visitor of the Heidelberg “circle” in the pre-World War I.8
Both Lukács and Habermas were convinced that the charismatic element of Weber’s
Caesar-like leader-democracy passed to the Schmittian notion of decisionism. In truth,
the origin of this controversy can be further backdated to a particular reading of Weber
15 as theorist of sheer power politics and herald of Nazism (Schapiro, 1945).9 It has been
pointed out, however, that this line of thought is characterized by an underlying reduc-
tionism, by what Strauss (1953, p. 42) has ironically deﬁned as reductio ad Hitlerum;
i.e. the polemical interpretation according to which Weber’s thought would have ines-
capably led to Nazi-fascism. It has been relatively easy, then, for a Weberian like
20 Guenther Roth to label these criticisms “ideological” because, “for ideological reasons,”
they “cannot recognize any dividing line between political sociology and political ideol-
ogy” (Bendix & Roth, 1971, p. 55).
The historical and ideological consequentiality that would have led Weber’s Führer-
demokratie – via Schmitt – to Hitler’s Drittes Reich has been reformulated, historicized,
25 and carried forward by Mommsen (1984) in his pioneering work Max Weber and
German Politics. According to him, “Schmitt merely drew radical conclusions from the
premises that were already outlined in Weber’s theory of legitimacy” (p. 449). More-
over, for Mommsen, Schmitt’s critique of partisan pluralism and his theory of plebisci-
tary authority are nothing but a conceptual “extension of Weber’s own program,” even
30 though – as he acknowledges – Schmitt developed his radical conclusions on political
leadership “by the thorough repression of all constitutional safeguards that Weber had
included” (pp. 382–3). Although very well documented, this seminal work rests on a
problematic methodology. From the outset, Mommsen (1984, p. xvii) declares that,
while previous works had usually tried to interpret Weber’s ideas and political thought
35 by reference to his theoretical writings, he undertakes the opposite approach of tracing
“Weber’s development as a politician by means of a detailed assessment of his position
on the day-to-day political issues.”10 This intellectual path, in my view, overlooks the
dialectical relationship between theory and practice that is essential to understand
Weber’s work.11 In fact, he is among the few scholars for whom the relevance of the-
40 ory lies in historical contingency as much as critical reﬂection on political praxis rests
on a momentous historical-theoretical crisis. As he put it, “it is always by the demon-
stration and solution of problems of substance that new sciences have been established
and their methods further developed” (Weber, 2012, p. 140). The amalgam of theory
and practice is especially, and “dangerously,” vivid in Schmitt’s work (2005, p. 34).
45 According to the legal theorist, “the distinction between theory and practice is one of
the consequences of the modern political thought which no longer possesses a concept
of nature.”12
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In this regard, McCormick (1998, p. 174) has highlighted how Schmitt’s work can
be read precisely as an attempt to overcome the Weberian categories in order to tran-
5scend the divides created during modernity between subject and object, nature and cul-
ture, theory and practice; a radical yet failed attempt that did not succeed in
overcoming in toto “Weber’s irrational tendencies.”13 For McCormick, it was Weber’s
neo-Kantian ideal of a “liberal” social science the target of Schmitt’s criticisms and the-
orizations. He cites a passage from Die Tyrannei der Werte to support his thesis (cf.
10McCormick, 1998, pp. 175–6). Nonetheless, the passage is misleading and decontextu-
alized because if read in its entirety, it would suggest not a critique but, on the contrary,
an endorsement of Weber’s position. For, in discussing Raymond Aron’s interpretation
of Weber’s vocational conferences, Schmitt (1960/2011, p. 42, my emphasis) stresses
how “it would be obviously wrong to reduce him [i.e. Weber] to some powerful pas-
15sages, neglecting his broader sociological insights. Moreover, no one thinks to tie him
down [festzulegen] to his neo-Kantian epistemology.” As we shall see in the next sec-
tions, it is precisely from Weber’s “post-Kantian awareness” that Schmitt attacks the
philosophical pretension to build an objective system of values.
This brief overview of the debate indicates quite clearly a fundamental difﬁculty in
20reconstructing the relationship between these two thinkers, which is partly due to the
polarization of the academic positions but, above all, to the ambiguity through which
Schmitt confronted himself with the sociologist of Erfurt (cf. Ulmen, 1985, p. 5). The
latter was equivocally deﬁned by Schmitt (1950/2001, p. 62) as “the great German
sociologist” or as an “intolerable” scholar with whom he felt disgusted for the “see-
25thing irrationality” of his thought that “with spasmodic convulsions tries to cover itself
with rational ﬁg leaves” (Schmitt, 1991, p. 113). As a matter of fact, Schmitt’s judg-
ment on Weber’s work – always fragmented and never systematic14 – changes and
evolves over time. It has undergone substantial modiﬁcations due to personal and his-
torical experiences over the course of an almost centenarian life. It has been suggested,
30however, that this ambiguity could be the expression of the so-called Schmitt’s “occa-
sionalism” and, accordingly, of the impossibility to establish with certainty his “ulti-
mate standpoint.” For, “Schmitt’s profane decisionism” – Löwith (1935/1995, p. 144)
has argued:
is necessarily occasional because he lacks not only the theological and metaphysical pre-
35suppositions of earlier centuries but the humanitarian-moral ones as well. […] What Sch-
mitt defends is a politics of sovereign decision, but one in which content is merely a
product of an accidental occasio of the political situation which happens to prevail at the
moment.
Without pretending to formulate a deﬁnitive interpretation of the intellectual relation-
40ship between these two scholars – or resorting to the “spark” of the occasio to explain
the oscillating ambiguity that characterizes it – the theory of values is used here as a
“Trojan horse” to decipher the continuity/discontinuity in the Weber–Schmitt relation. I
believe that behind their reasoning for values lay some crucial categories that might
provide an understanding – if not unitary, at least substantive – of their thought. The
45fruitfulness of this analytical approach, I argue, lies in the possibility of tracking down
a profound philosophical core upon which Weber and Schmitt rooted two different con-
ceptions of history and politics. This attempt requires a genealogical reconstruction of
their intellectual journey that has its apex in the theory of values. Their “narrative of
values,” in fact, does not merely rest on a scientiﬁc conception or historical experience,
50but also on a different “image of history,” of its progress and meaning. In this sense, it
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mirrors an ontological distinction between these two German scholars. In other words,
the discourse on values – in the thought of Weber and Schmitt – begins not at the
inception but at the end of a crisis. For them, the question of the foundation of values
is not an ontological problem per se, but an historical one which becomes ontologi-
5 cal once the process of rationalization-secularization has exceeded a certain critical
threshold: modernity.
A short genealogy of ‘value’: origins, evolution, and fragmentation
The value has its own logic, i.e. “those who speak of value want to valorize and to
impose.” For, “no one can evaluate without devaluing, revaluating, and exploiting.
10 Whoever sets values has thus already positioned himself against non-values [Unwerte]”
(Schmitt, 1960/2011, pp. 44–46). This is, in a nutshell, Schmitt’s position on the prob-
lem of values. To understand its historico-political effectiveness, it is necessary to situ-
ate this view within the larger debate on the problématique of values that emerged in
the nineteenth century, matured at the ﬁn de siècle and exploded into full force in the
15 twentieth century.15 Value is, in fact, a keyword, a symbol of the Western historico-po-
litical-philosophical development; “one of the best physiognomic features to design the
proﬁle of the current age” (Ortega y Gasset, 1923/2004, p. 11). In its conceptual his-
tory, it enshrines and condenses the crisis and parable of modernity. In particular, two
epochal trajectories intersect and overlap within this “conceptual container”: the process
20 of secularization of ethics and the economization of the social world. These are two
parallel and contiguous developments that, over time, tend to imbricate. On the one
hand, therefore, in the words of Weber (1949, p. 107), who emphasizes its economic
and political ﬁliation, the term “value” is the “unfortunate child of misery of our
science”; i.e. the mature fruit of that “spirit of capitalism” that has now become “victo-
25 rious.”16 On the other hand, for Schmitt, this term embraces a “crisis of disenchant-
ment”; i.e. values try to ﬁll the chasm opened by nihilism, the horror vacui produced
by the decline of ethics: “value and what is valuable are turned into a positivistic surro-
gate [Ersatz] for the metaphysical” (Schmitt, 1960/2011, p. 37).17 For the two scholars,
in sum, values emerge when the economic rationalization and disenchantment have
30 wrapped the social world in a fog like ghosts of a by-now-extinct ethos.
As a matter of fact, in an ethical sense, the ancients did not know the concept of
value, but rather that of Good (ἀγαθόν). Plato (1902, p. 60), for instance, has Socrates
say in The Republic that the “thing which gives the things which are known their truth
[τὴν ἀλήθειαν] … is the idea of the good [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν].” Just as Aristotle states
35 (1894, p. 138), although from a very different perspective, at the beginning of the First
Book of Politics, “every community [πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν] is established with a view to
some good [ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἕνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν]”; reiterating what he had already estab-
lished in the Nicomachean Ethics (1900, p. 9), i.e. that “the knowledge of the good” is
“the highest [τῆς κυριωτάτης] master science [ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς]” and “this is obviously
40 the science of politics [ἡ πολιτικὴ].” In the scholastic era, the medieval Doctor Angeli-
cus Aquinatis Aquinatis, (1862, p. 236), following the classical notion, could still write
in his Summa contra Gentiles: summum igitur bonum, quod est Deus, est causa bonitatis
in omnibus bonis (the highest good which is God is the cause of the goodness in all
good things). What we have, therefore, is an ethical notion of good thought of as either
45 transcendent or objective. Whether conceived as an archetype, principle of reason or
Divinity, the Good – and not value – is the North Star toward which humanity should
point. It can be thought of as transcendence that determines and qualiﬁes immanence,
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or “the Good above all that is good” according to the well-known deﬁnition by Plotinus
(1956, p. 620). However, this meaning gets progressively lost with the decline of the
5medieval age and the advent of modernity. The ﬁrst partial break occurs with Hobbes
(1651/2005, p. 144) who, in the Leviathan section devoted to the “rights of sovereigns,”
discusses those “values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves.”18 Yet, Hobbes
here maintains the Latin root of the word. Value is still understood as virtus and honor.19
It is therefore only thanks to the classical economists, in particular Smith (1776) and
10Ricardo (1817), that the term value becomes popular and spreads beyond the boundaries
of the economic ﬁeld. And the greater the diffusion, the more subjectiﬁed the concept,
absorbing in its semantic ﬁeld other forms of knowledge. Thus, value is turned into a
polysemic term that embraces all modes of being: there are cultural, aesthetic, political,
economic, artistic values, etc. (cf. Volpi, 2008).
15Kant is perhaps the last thinker who tried to distinguish between ethics, dignity,
and value while, at the same time, recomposing the fracture that occurred between the
subject (dignitas) and the object (value). In Die Metaphysik des Sitten (1797/1996,
p. 186), discussing the doctrine of virtue, he differentiates “a human being (homo phae-
nomenon)” who in the mere system of nature is simply “a being of slight importance
20and shares with the rest of the animals … an ordinary value (pretium vulgare)” from a
human being “subject of morally practical reason,” namely regarded “as person (homo
noumenon).” The latter cannot “be valuated merely as means to the ends of other or
even to his own ends, but as an end in himself” because “he possess a dignity (an
absolute inner worth).” For Kant (1797/1996, p. 187), it is the moral duty that elevates
25human subjectivity toward universality, compelling the human being to revere his own
person, to feel “his inner worth (valor), in terms of which he is above any price” (pre-
tium), and “instills in him respect for himself (reverentia).” As Schmitt (1960/2011,
p. 12–14) remarks at the beginning of his essay, this fundamental distinction between
the value of things and the dignity of the person got completely lost because “a hun-
30dred years of rapid industrialization has essentially transformed value in an economic
category,” so that “a metamorphosis in values, a general valorization [allgemeine
Ver-Wertung], is now taking place in all spheres of our social existence.”
Yet, there is more. As previously mentioned, this process of economicization of
social life is intimately linked to the collapse of the Christian ethos and the seculariza-
35tion of its ethics. While, under the pressure of the capitalist spirit, we witness the econ-
omization of life, in which everything becomes commensurable; on the other hand, and
specularly, we observe the fragmentation of ethics in a multiplicity of values “ethically
devalued.” This crucial moment in Western history has been described with extraordi-
nary force as the advent of the “uncanniest of all guests”: nihilism (Nietzsche, 1906/
401968, p. 7). It is Nietzsche, in fact, that through his attempt at an Umwertung aller
Werte brings the category of value at the center of the political and philosophical
debate. As Heidegger (1943/2002, p. 169) has acutely argued, “in the nineteenth cen-
tury, talk of values became frequent, and it became customary to think in values. How-
ever, it was only as a consequence of the broadcasting of Nietzsche’s writings that talk
45of values has become popular.”
“What does nihilism mean?” – Nietzsche (1906/1968, p. 9) asks at the beginning of
The Will to Power. “That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking;
‘why?’ ﬁnds no answer.” It is in this chasm opened by nihilism, in this loss of meaning
of ancient morality, that values take the center of the speculative stage. Nihilism erodes
50the place of Christianity because, as Nietzsche (1906/1968, p. 7) points out, it is in the
end of Christianity that it is rooted. At the same time, however, the abyss left open by
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the “death of God” is not reﬁlled. Nihilism reveals this fundamental event without
replacing it, but rather leaves all questions suspended and unanswered. What happens
to ethics after the “death of God”? What do values represent for the human being once
5 they have been stripped of the alleged objectivity of Christianity? What does it entail
to live and think in terms of values in the political sphere?
Nietzsche’s philosophy thus brings to the center of the philosophical debate the
problématique of values declined through the conceptual fracture opened between sub-
ject and object, in the “antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any
10 exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior” (Nietzsche, 1874/
2007, p. 78). On the one hand, this opens the way to the question as to how to re-estab-
lish an ethical personalism through which “to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility
for your actions yourself and to relieve God, world, ancestors, chance and society of the
burden” (Nietzsche, 2002, p. 21). On the other, it raises the dilemma of how to reconsti-
15 tute an objectivity, a solid foundation, when even the concept of “necessity” has become
nothing more than a “conventional ﬁction,” where in the “itself” there is nothing like
necessity; in a world, in short, in which “there is no rule of ‘law’.” It is around these
issues that a genuine Wertphilosophie arises. Initially, from within the neo-Kantian
School of Baden, thanks to the work of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. The
20 latter in his book The Limits of Concept Formation (1802/1986, pp. 215–6), trying to
re-establish a philosophy of history on axiological basis, when “neither empirical actual-
ity [Wirklichkeit] nor a metaphysical reality [Realität] is qualiﬁed to endow … science
and history with objectivity,” had determined that “this objectivity can be grounded only
on the validity of theoretical values.” Accordingly, this way of thinking led to the belief
25 that “historical science must be allowed to assume that the unique development of real-
ity stands in a necessary relationship to some unconditionally and generally valid val-
ues” (p. 223). The objectivity of history was therefore recovered through recourse to the
category of general values of universal validity. As well known, Weber was initially
inﬂuenced by Rickert – especially by the notion of Wertbeziehung (value relation) – in
30 developing his epistemological works.20 Yet, it is precisely by breaking away from the
neo-Kantian positions of the Baden School that Weber would succeed in developing an
original theory of values.21 As we shall see, it is from within the crisis of the philosophy
of values that Schmitt and Weber would try to redesign the boundaries and meaning of
this category.
35 The end of a world: the value of history within the history of value
On 2 April 1913, Weber (2012, p. 406) writes to his friend Robert Wilbrandt: “I hold
the view that what dominates the sphere of values is the irresolvable conﬂict, and con-
sequently the necessity of constant compromises; no one, except a religion based on
‘revelation’, can claim to decide in a binding form how those compromises should be
40 made.” This view, already violently questioned at the time of Weber – and who accom-
panied him for most of his life – appears in a similar form in several of his writings
(cf. Weber, 1904/2012, p. 103; 1917/2012, p. 314; 1922/2012, p. 348). In the Anglo-
Saxon world, it has been described as the antithesis between facts and values, or facts
and decision (Löwith, 1964, p. 509). Factor and Turner (1979, p. 304, my emphasis),
45 for example, by analyzing what they call the Weberian doctrine of irreconcilability
between facts and values, argue that Weber would have postulated that “value positions
are ultimately non-rational” and, for this reason, would not be susceptible to
compromise. Moreover, Weber would have developed this position without having
AQ15
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actually discussed (and confute) all previous philosophical doctrines (Mill, Durkheim,
5Hobhouse, etc.) according to which the value positions may indeed be rationally justi-
ﬁed. Accordingly, Weber would have exposed himself to the risk of irrationality by
excluding a priori the possibility of “rational dialogue between valuative positions and
other positions” (p. 304).
Here we encounter, in my view, an initial misunderstanding of Weber’s position.
10When Weber (1919/1946, p. 147) states “the impossibility of ‘scientiﬁcally’ pleading
for practical and interested stands,” he is not suggesting that the spheres of value, given
their incommensurability, are not subject to rational discussion. For, irrationality does
not concern the positions, their potential discursivity or intelligibility, but their founda-
tion. What is worthy of being known, lived, and fought for, cannot be ascertained
15objectively by means of science but “can only be interpreted with reference to its ulti-
mate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position
towards life” (Weber 1919/1946, p. 143). In other words, for Weber, rationality cannot
establish itself as sovereign, cannot objectively take root in history, and cannot
scientiﬁcally prove its necessity. There is no question of criticizing the limitations of
20the Weberian conception of rationality, but it is rather important to understand the logi-
cal and historical limits of reason. In discussing this issue, for instance, Herbert A.
Simon has emphasized:
In the domain of reasoning, the difﬁculty in ﬁnding a fulcrum resides in the truism “no
conclusions without premises.” Reasoning processes take symbolic inputs and deliver sym-
25bolic outputs. The initial inputs are axioms, themselves not derived by logic but simply
induced from empirical observations, or even more simply posited. […] Axioms and infer-
ence rules together constitute the fulcrum on which the lever of reasoning rests; but the
particular structure of that fulcrum cannot be justiﬁed by the methods of reasoning. For an
attempt at such a justiﬁcation would involve us in an inﬁnite regress of logics, each as
30arbitrary in its foundations as the preceding one. […] The corollary to “no conclusions
without premises” is “no ought’s from is’s alone.” Thus, whereas reason may provide pow-
erful help in ﬁnding means to reach our ends, it has little to say about the ends themselves.
(Simon, 1983, pp. 5–7)22
The problem of values is, therefore, that of their foundation. Here what is at stake is
35not merely whether they can be rationally discussed or universally justiﬁed. The ques-
tion is not, to quote Nietzsche (1886/2002, p. 13), “how are synthetic judgment a priori
possible?” but rather “why is the belief in such a judgment necessary?” As we shall
see, for Weber and Schmitt rationality, once entered the world of historical becoming,
is not at all necessary and cannot avoid the irreconcilability between the various subjec-
40tive points of view that – as all equally unfounded – are considered “dangerously”
objective.
Strauss (1953, p. 42) has described this position as nihilistic because, embracing the
Weberian thesis, “every preference, however evil, base, or insane, has to be judged
before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference.” He ﬁnds
45intolerable (1953, p. 48, my emphasis) that one considers “equally legitimate to will or
not to will truth, or to reject truth in favor of the beautiful and the sacred. Why, then,
should one not prefer pleasing delusions or edifying myths to the truth?” However, as
is clear from this passage, Strauss’ critique is based on notions of truth (understood as
logical adequacy) and rationality that are geographically and historically limited, and
50yet for him they become the fulcrum of a universalist vision of ethics and nature.23
Good and evil, truth and justice are concepts that Strauss inherits from a “noble” tradi-
tion entered into crisis after all former illusions, “the ‘way to true being,’ the ‘way to
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true art,’ the ‘way to true nature,’ the ‘way to true God,’ the ‘way to true happiness,’
have been dispelled” (Weber, 1919/1946, p. 143). What is the “true Truth” that reason
5 must inspire, search for, and preserve in an age in which the intellectual and spiritual
center is lacking? “[W]hat meaning does our being have, if it were not that will to truth
has become conscious of itself as a problem in us?” (Nietzsche, 1887/2013, p. 273). As
Löwith has correctly argued:
[…] both opponents and advocates of the separation between knowledge and evaluation
10 misjudge Weber’s central motif of this distinction; i.e. the recognition that today we live in
a world that is objectiﬁed by scientiﬁc technology and that, on the other hand, the objec-
tive rationality of science has freed us from general and binding norms of moral and reli-
gious type. Therefore, our old values cannot rely on traditions or be scientiﬁcally justiﬁed,
because good and evil are now matter of personal decision. (Löwith, 1964, p. 509–510)
15 Strauss’ critique then misses its target because the problem raised by Weber is not that
of the negation or rational re-establishment of a universal pivot (Strauss’ “natural law”)
through which to face the advancement of nihilism and extreme relativism. The thesis
of the heterogeneity of values illuminates a substantive – and not formal – historico-
ontological problem. The fragmentation brought about by the disenchantment by means
20 of technology is both a subjective liberation and a destruction of the collective center.
When the Christian ethos, perceived as objective, collapses under the blows of science
and technology, a fulcrum capable of recomposing the fragmentation can no longer be
recreated because the techno-scientiﬁc dynamic transforms the inﬁnite progressivism
and groundlessness into its own ontology. For Weber, therefore, disenchantment means
25 the end of “the faith in some kind of ‘objective’ meaning […] Since all objectives have
lost their objective meaning as a result of the rationalisation carried through by human
beings, they are now available to human subjectivity in a new way: for the determina-
tion of their meaning” (Löwith, 1932/1993, p. 76). The ratio, in sum, is no ethos. It
does not coagulate actions and perceptions in a form of life that is concretely and ob-
30 jectively universal; it does not transform a syllogism into conduct of life. Albeit the
supreme and ultimate value judgments give meaning and direction to our lives, so that
they are experienced as something objectively signiﬁcant, they have their ultimate foun-
dation in the sphere of individuality. Consequently, on the ground of history, there are
no universally just and necessary values, but only values believed to be such. “It is the
35 fate of our culture, however, that we are again becoming more clearly aware of this sit-
uation, after a millennium during which our (allegedly or supposedly) exclusive orien-
tation toward the sublime fervor of the Christian ethic eyes had blinded us to this
situation” (Weber, 1919/2012, p. 348).
For these reasons, Weber rejects the metaphysical anchorage (metaphysische Verän-
40 kerung) proposed by Windelband (and then again, in a different form, by Rickert). For
the neo-Kantian philosopher if “truth is not our discovery or our illusion, but a value
that is rooted in the ultimate depths of reality,” this means that “the life of values
demands a metaphysical anchorage, and, if we give the name God to this super-empiri-
cal vital connection of personalities, we may say that his reality is given in the reality
45 of conscience itself” (Windelband, 1914/1921, p. 326). But Weber cuts the Gordian
knot that binds the metaphysical universal to the historical particular because once
“God is dead, there is no grounding by which one perspective could have legitimacy
over other perspectives” (Löwith, 1993, p. 18). There is no a priori or axiology that
holds back reality once truth from certainty and axiom has become problem and abyss
50 of meaning:
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The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we
cannot learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect;
it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. (Weber, 1904/1949, p. 57).
Weber’s departure from the neo-Kantian school, therefore, takes place precisely on the
5grounds of a historical crisis (disenchantment) that reveals an ontological problématique
(the groundlessness of the center): the de facto impossibility of an objective evaluation
via the sciences and, at the same time, the concrete and substantive impossibility of
ﬁnding a universal pivot upon which to establish an objective ethics to guide politics
and public morality. As predicted by Rickert (1902/1986, p. 220), “such a doubt, how-
10ever, if carried out consistently for all values, would destroy the concept of truth itself.”
How to recompose a unity, then, from the fragmentation of subjective values? How is
it possible to create an order in the age of the new secular polytheism? And what is the
relationship between the political realm and that of values? These are the questions that
Schmitt, following the Weberian discourse, will try to develop.
15The value of politics and the politics of values
The “principle of groundlessness” just explored raises two interrelated issues, which
rest on the same ontology (i.e. the crisis of the metaphysical center): (1) Epistemo-
logico-methodological: science cannot decide, with its own means, which values we
should embrace; (2) Ethico-political: since values are perceived subjectively as some-
20thing universal and objective, they tend to promote ideological absolutism and moral
exclusivism. The latter issue is grounded on a fundamental problem: once the sky has
lost its “transcendental cover,” it tends to be “repainted,” as it were, with the subjective
colors of ideology; in the age of immanence, the ancient gods, stripped of their
enchantment and in impersonal form, dominate again people’s lives. In Weber’s words,
25“so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of
an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another. Or speaking directly, the ulti-
mately possible attitudes toward life are irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can
never be brought to a ﬁnal conclusion” (Weber, 1946, p. 152). Not even the “temperate
objectivity” of apriorism can resolve this tension inherent in acting in the era of disen-
30chantment. In a very dense fragment that is worth quoting in extenso, Weber (2012,
pp. 421–2) expressed in this way his dissent from the Kantian perspective:
Formal ethics has to face the fact that its propositions do not enable it to deduce substan-
tive conclusions – even within the ethical domain itself, let alone concerning conﬂicts
between value spheres. An attempt to perform such a deduction would be just as sterile as
35if one wanted to deduce, say, substantive chemical facts from logical propositions. The
Kantian imperatives, too, are valid analysis of certain elementary facts concerning the way
in which ethical judgments are made. Irrespective of the function that they may conse-
quently have in connection with substantive decisions in the ﬁeld of ethics, they in any
case do not support any kind of decision concerning the ethically irrational conﬂict of the
40value sphere.24
For Weber, in short, there would be a sort of hiatus irrationalis between formal ethics
– which rests on an abstract logic – and historical values – which are linked to concrete
substances and subjectivities. Abstract logic cannot stem the desire that inspires con-
crete historical action. On the other hand, when action enters history, it has to deal with
45“the meaningless inﬁnity of the world process.” It has to accept, therefore, that this
challenge and its destiny are not completely rationalizable. In other words, logic
AQ22
10 A. Cerella
RCUV 1141833 CE: PS QA: RS
29 January 2016 Coll: QC:Initial
cannot restrain “das Konkretissimum des Erlebens” (the concreteness of experience; cf.
Schmitt, 2011, p. 22; Weber, 1922, p. 428).
Carl Schmitt essentially agrees with this position. For him, the logic of value is in
5 fact characterized by an “immanent aggressiveness” because values – although high,
sacred, and just – push to be constantly actualized, and can only be realized by some-
one against someone else: “Whether something has value and how much, whether
something is worthy and to what extent can be determined only from an assumed point
of view or particular vantage-point. The philosophy of values is a point-philosophy
10 [Punkt-Philosophie]; the ethics of value a point-ethics [Punkt-Ethik]” (Schmitt, 2011,
p. 41). This “prospective pointillism” is intrinsically dangerous because “values as such
are brought by actual [konktreten] people to bear upon other actual people.” Accord-
ingly, “the genuinely subjective freedom of value-setting leads […] to an endless strug-
gle of all against all, to an endless bellum omnium contra omnes” (p. 45, 39).
15 As known, it is precisely to square the circle of practical philosophy and to mediate
between the concreteness of action and the need for a non-formal ethics that Max Scheler
(1916/1973, p. 6) had attempted to recovery the category of value and to overcome
Kant’s “empty apriorism,” as it “bars us from any true insight into the place of moral val-
ues in man’s life.” For Scheler (p. xxix), overcoming Kant’s formalism means to build a
20 system of values based on “the living center of individual person” without neither depriv-
ing her of the historical-relativist habitus nor renouncing to the universality of the “idea
of an absolute ethics itself.” However, Schmitt attacks Scheler’s pretension to build a
non-formal [material] and universal axiology. For, in the realm of the political, values
positions are subject to a fatal reversibility and get constantly overturned, so that “their
25 meaning and function […] change with the changing planes” (p. 42). Is not enough,
therefore, to build a scale of values, as Scheler does, to hold on and stem the crisis of
nihilism and the dangerous freedom of the subject to decide:
To claim an objective character for values which we set up means only to create a new
occasion for rekindling the aggressiveness in the struggle of valuations, to introduce a new
30 instrument of self-righteousness, without for that matter increasing in the least the objective
evidence for those people who think differently. The subjective theory of values has not
yet been rendered obsolete, nor have the objective values prevailed: the subject has not
been obliterated, nor have the value carriers, whose interests are served by the standpoints,
viewpoints, and points of attack of values, been reduced to silence. (Schmitt, 2011, p. 46)
35 The thetically grounded structure [thetisch-setzerischen Struktur] of values emerges in
all its strength when one considers the concept of Angriffspunkt. According to Schmitt,
when Weber uses this expression, he literally means it as “point of attack.”25 To think
along the logic of values means – knowingly or unknowingly – thinking attack strate-
gies. In the world of values, therefore, there would be no room for a weak conceptual
40 relativism, but only for the potential aggressiveness inherent in the purely subjective
freedom to reason in terms of values (the potential to attack, in fact).
This latent conﬂictuality becomes more evident in the political realm. According to
Weber (1946, p. 121, 124), for instance, “[f]rom no ethics in the world can it be con-
cluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose ‘justiﬁes’ the ethically dan-
45 gerous means”; and this is because “the speciﬁc means of legitimate violence as such
in the hand of human associations […] determines the peculiarity of all ethical
problems of politics.” The sphere of politics is, therefore, different from that of
morality and ethics because in it lurks the constant possibility of violence, the tragic
tension between different world views. This position is typical of classical realism and
50 can be traced back up to Machiavelli. According to Berlin (2001, p. 74), for example,
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Machiavelli’s cardinal achievement would be “the recognition that ends equally
ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each other, that entire systems of value may
come into collision without possibility of rational arbitration.” Politics (the sphere of
conﬂict) and ethics (the sphere of values) would be two worlds toto caelo different,
5which is necessary to keep distinct and distant. This is the reason why, according to
Weber, it is essential to structure the conﬂict within the parliamentary system. If “all
politics is essentially struggle,” it becomes crucial then to select adequate political lead-
ers through a battle that takes place within the political boundaries of the parliament
(Weber, 1918/2007, p. 219). Parliament provides the public arena in which political
10struggle is transformed into discussion and selection.
It is at this level, then, that we encounter a ﬁrst difference between Weber and
Schmitt. When Weber speaks of struggle and conﬂict, Schmitt translates with violence
and annihilation. If for Weber politics is struggle (Kampf ), for Schmitt (1932/2007,
p. 33) das Politische implies “the real possibility of physical killing.” For the sociolo-
15gist of Erfurt, in short, struggle does not automatically translate into violence and bel-
lum omnium contra omnes (as for Schmitt) precisely because the fragmentation of
values can (and should) be caged within institutional and democratic arenas. If it is true
that between values there is a an “irreconcilable death-struggle […] like that between
‘God’ and the ‘Devil,” it is equally true that “[t]here are, of course, as everyone real-
20izes in the course of his life, compromises, both in fact and in appearance, and at every
point. In almost every important attitude of real human beings, the value-spheres cross
and interpenetrate” (Weber, 1949, p. 17–18). This means that for Weber the clash is not
inevitable, and fragmentation – the pluralism of values and, accordingly, of parties –
can be reassembled in the political arena. Moreover, Weber’s emphasis is always on
25the individual, both in the form of the charismatic and religious leader. In the vast Reli-
gionssoziologie, the individual plays a central role in the exploration of historical ten-
dencies. It goes without saying that, given his anti-liberalism, there is no trace of this
methodological individualism in the work of Schmitt. This difference is not only the
sign of a different methodological choice. Quite the contrary, Schmitt’s anti-liberalism,
30although ideological, is rooted on a precise ontology: in the void of meaning of the era
of disenchantment, the individual cannot self-represent himself, is not capable of creat-
ing any unity. This crucial position can already be found in his early works. In Der
Wert des Staates, Schmitt, for example, states (1914, p. 4): “If anything can be said of
individuality, it is because the object of the predicated individuality has been already
35deﬁned as attribution point for an evaluation under norms.” This means that the indi-
vidual does not exist outside the law that constitutes him; and since the idea of law is
not self-grounded but needs to be actualized, the state becomes the form to which
Schmitt (1914, p. 2, 93, my emphasis) entrusts the establishment of justice: “the sense
of the state consists exclusively in the task of actualizing Law into the world [Recht in
40der Welt]” and, in this sense, “it is not the state a construction that people have made
but, on the contrary, the state makes every man into a construction.”
If it is true therefore that Weber follows the classical realist doctrine, with its rigid
dualism between public and private ethics, and the consequent primacy of political
(salus rei publicae suprema lex), that of Schmitt is a dualism of different origin and
45nature. Weber, in fact, posits a political unity necessarily given and unproblematic as
the foundation of a public sphere. The parliament can play a selective and discursive
function just because it is “sealed,” as it were, within the state. But for Schmitt (1923/
2000, p. 6), this mechanism is now in crisis “because the development of modern mass
democracy has made argumentative public discussion an empty formality.” The political
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5 chambers cannot contain the popular energy that spurts out of the institutions in the era
of the “revolt of the masses.” The ethic of the state then becomes an ethic of emer-
gency, a “hunt of the political”: “Political unity is the highest unity – not because it is
an omnipotent dictator, or because it levels out all other unities, but because it decides,
and has the potential to prevent all other opposing groups from dissociating into a state
10 of extreme enmity – that is, into civil war” (Schmitt, 1930/1999, p. 203). Behind the
necessity and the superiority of the state, there is always, for Schmitt, the deconstruc-
tive power of the political. The salvation of the state is not “the greater good” because,
like for Weber, the Nation is more important than the individual, the collectivity counts
more than the Ego, and the private cannot exist without the public, but rather because
15 individuals are seen as carriers of the deconstructive potential of the political, of its
never-ending intensity.
Although this view certainly reveals what Löwith (1935/1998, p. 166) has deﬁned
“the catastrophic manner of thinking characteristic of the generation of Germans after
the First World War,” it also conceals a deeper core that makes the differences between
20 Schmitt’s and Weber’s thought more evident. While, in fact, for the latter, as we have
seen, the era of disenchantment is characterized by a fragmentation of values – and the
deconstruction of the religious cosmos – for Schmitt, secularization assumes, paradoxi-
cally, a theological form. The theological, in other words, leaves an irreducible remain
in modernity: the compulsion toward order (Galli, 1996). For Schmitt, the problem of
25 unity is the “white shadow” that the theological casts on modernity. And since this
unity is no longer representable by means of transcendence, it has to reconstitute itself
in a void of meaning. The state – unfounded but constantly forced to refound itself –
must represent itself vis-à-vis nothingness, in the face of death. The modern political
form therefore becomes nihilistic representation, opening in front of death; murder sus-
30 pended in time, eternally possible and postponed. In this sense, it should also be read
the so-called Schmitt’s decisionism. The sovereign – who is not a speciﬁc person even
though is an actual agent – is the one who is capable of deciding the enemy in order to
constitute his own political unity. Such a unity – sovereignly created but always at risk
of disintegration – to be preserved has to remain open as totality (friend) in front of
35 death and represent itself vis-à-vis its negation (enemy). We touch here the extreme
limit of the biopolitical conception: life (conceived as bio-totality) to preserve itself
must constantly be exposed to death. The state “cannot permit its members to die for
their beliefs or to commit suicide, when the political unity of those members demands
the sacriﬁce of life” (Löwith, 1935/1998, p. 153). The living being is thus sucked into
40 the Leviathan’s maw.
It is at this point that the crucial difference between Weber and Schmitt emerges in
full force. Weber too, as is well known, advocates a form of decisionism. For him too
decision “opens” history. Yet, for Weber, the ontological signiﬁcance of the decision
lies in the search for meanings in an era devoid of Meaning. The human being – as a
45 cultural being – is a seeker and creator of meanings, and decision represents the ethical
choice of the individual in the age of disenchantment:
life as a whole, if it is to be lived in full awareness and is not just to unfold like a natural
event – involves a series of fundamental decisions through which the soul, as Plato
describes it, chooses its own fate, – the meaning, that is, of its activity and being. (Weber
50 1917/2012, p. 315)
It is, therefore, upon the ontology of decision in the midst of the “vacuum of values”
that Weber and Schmitt meet for a last time, revealing their differences. Ultimately, the
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Schmittian decision-for-the-form and the Weberian decision-for-the-meaning rest on
two “ethical worlds” that are light years away from each other.
5Conclusion: ethics in the immediacy of the world
The discourses of Weber and Schmitt on values represent two different – if contiguous
– attempts to respond to the crisis of meaning in the age of immanence. As I tried to
show, while Schmitt promotes a leviathanic vision of ethics and politics, Weber
attempts to safeguard the rationality of the individual because he believes that the ratio
10becomes all the more important when it lacks a foundation. Thus, in modernity, free-
dom becomes an absolute negative: freedom from any foundation. Knowing how to
accept – and measure with responsibility – the risks and potentialities that this freedom
involves means being able “to countenance the stern seriousness of our fateful times.”
Schmitt, on the other hand, cannot accept this position because he sees in the “mys-
15tery of the political,” and the violence that it entails, the last remaining force. This vio-
lent fate becomes all the more acute in the age of “unstructured immanence” and of the
crisis of the state in which values, like loose cannon, collide with one another. If, in
fact, “the idea needs mediation, value demands much more of that mediation.” If the
center and its boundaries are lacking, then for Schmitt the purpose of justice becomes
20“to prevent the terror of the immediate and automatic enactment of values” (Schmitt,
1960/2011, p. 54). However, in this writer’s opinion, this analysis appears anachronis-
tic. In the so-called global era, at the wane and collapse of the jus publicum Euro-
paeum, one can no longer “hide” the individual within the frame of the state and
entrust the formation and mediation of values to the ﬁctio of sovereignty. The unlimited
25potential of man can no longer be chained to a political form (as Schmitt argues in his
Political Theology). The real problem of sovereign power, then, does not lie in having
“denuded” human’s life – i.e. as in Hobbes, in having transformed security in control
and freedom in biopolitics – but in having considered human potential and freedom an
universal threat. This means that Schmitt’s idea of modernity can be read as the desper-
30ate attempt to control the uncontrollable; i.e. the inﬁnite human capacity understood as
a contingency, so ending up stripping away life of its form-of-life, transforming it in
mere naked life. But today we are aware that the friend–enemy dialectic no longer gen-
erates neither form nor unity but only violent confrontation. In the post-Auschwitz
world it is no longer acceptable to attribute to the “power of the elements” the political
35destiny of human beings. As Taubes (1993/2004, p. 109) poetically wrote contra Sch-
mitt: “Earth and sea – without human beings, the elements after all remain ‘matter’
(not even ‘matter’) – When humanism has been depleted […] then that only means,
does it not, that the question concerning human being is just posed more radically.”
Today, paradoxically, we ﬁnd ourselves in front of the situation that Schmitt had
40described already in 1914:
There are times of mediation and times of immediacy. In the latter, the devotion of the
individual to the Idea is something people take for granted. There is no need for a highly
organized state to support the recognition of law [Recht]; on the opposite, the state seems
to stand, according to Angelus Silesius’ saying, like a wall before the light. (Schmitt,
451914, p. 108)
In the immediacy of the global world, we can no longer nullify ourselves in the totality
of the state, in the hope of being protected from our anxieties by giving up our ethical
choices. Today, in a novel and immediate form, history calls us forcefully to choose
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our fate. In the mare magnum produced by contemporary globalization, the individual
5 – if she does not want to sink in the chaotic ﬂow of events – is called to a moral deci-
sion, to look into this formless tide to ﬁnd guidance, meaning, and, above all, the sense
of her otherness. In substance, Max Weber’s problem is still with us. Yet the question
of values, of their implementation and reversibility, presents itself to us in a more radi-
cal and post-statual form, and requires a choice and an even greater responsibility. Just
10 as Däubler (1916/1919, p. 65) had sung in an enigmatic poetry, central to understand-
ing the work of Schmitt:
The enemy is the embodiment of our own question.
And he becomes us; we chase him to the same end.
But violence comes from people’s prudence.
15 The ancestors meet themselves on the promontories
And remain silent when the tide clashes with the tide.26
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Notes
25 1. “Das Böse ist der Sternhimmel des Guten.”
2. Cf. Weber (1949, pp. 55, 112) and Schmitt (1929/2007, pp. 82–89).
3. This is the guiding idea of the seminal works by Ulmen (1985, 1991). For a similar inter-
pretation, which analyses the Weber–Schmitt relationship within the larger frame of the cri-
sis of modernity, see Galli (1996, pp. 77–122).
30 4. For an overview, see Engelbrekt (2009).
5. I follow the analytical distinction developed by Colliot Thélène but I don’t agree with her
conclusions. First, it is an oversimpliﬁcation to deﬁne Weber an “economist” (even though
Weber sometimes deﬁnes himself – for intellectual humility – in this way). Second, it is
misleading to stigmatize Weber’s theory of rationalization as a teleological and irreversible
35 process (on this point see, Weiss, 1987). Finally, as I shall explain, if Schmitt, unlike Weber,
ﬁghts against the “disenchantment” is just because he “ideologizes” politics and law in a
way that would be too one-sided to Weber.
6. The original text is a lecture delivered by Schmitt in a seminar organized by his friend Ernst
Forsthoff in the town of Ebrach on 23 October 1959. Along with Schmitt, other important
40 scholars attended the meeting including Joachim Ritter, Julien Freund, Reinhard Koselleck,
Arnold Gehlen, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. The original theme of the seminar was “The
Dissolution of the Unity of Science” (cf. Mußgnug, Mußgnug, & Reinthal, 2007, p. 149).
However, after Forsthoff’s speech on “Virtue and Value in the Theory of the State” (Tugend
und Wert in der Staatslehre) the debate shifted on this topic. Schmitt’s contribution was ﬁrst
45 printed in a volume “not for sale” dedicated to those who were in Ebrach, cf. Schmitt, C.
(1960). Die Tyrannei der Werte. Überlegungen eines Juristen zur Wert-Philosophie, 200
copies. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. A shorter German version was released, without Schmitt’s
knowledge, in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 146 (27 June 1964). For this reason, the
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“unaltered” [unverändert] document, with a new introduction, was included in a volume
5issued in honor of Forsthoff’s sixty-ﬁfth birthday, cf. Schmitt, C. (1967). Die Tyrannei der
Werte. In S. Buve (Hrsg.), Säkularisation und Utopie. Ebracher Studien. Ernst Forsthoff
zum 65 Geburstag (pp. 37–62). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Schmitt’s borrows the expression
Tyranny of Values from Nicolai Hartmann’s Ethics (1926/1932, p. 423): “Every value –
when once it has gained power over a person – has the tendency to set itself up as sole tyr-
10ant of the whole human ethos, and indeed at the expense of other values, even of such as
are not inherently opposed to it.” I have translated the German word Werte with “values”
and not with “valors” to respect Schmitt’s intension. For, in one of his last public appear-
ances (9 November 1982), Schmitt (2005, pp. 177–8) interviewed by Fulco Lanchester for
the Italian journal Quaderni Costituzionali pointed out that “the essay [The Tyranny of
15Values] is focused on the conﬂict among values. I argue that value is a concept that leads
ineffably to economization. What is the highest value? An answer can be found only if you
have already rightly economized. You see, this is my thesis. And now the new Pope John
Paul II speaks of values and doesn’t know what he is talking about referring to German
philosophers such as Max Scheler. It is so sad and I feel very sorry for this. What should
20we do? This is very dangerous.”.
7. The expression appears in the Inaugural Lecture delivered by Weber in May 1895 at Frei-
burg University. Cf. Weber (1895/2007, p. 27). On the various meanings of this concept,
see Roth (1984).
8. On Weber and Lukács, see Gluck (1985) and Weber (1988, pp. 465–466).
259. See also Gerth’s reply (1945).
10. It is not my intention to criticize Mommsen. Moreover, in the preface to the English edition
(1984, p. vii), he recognizes some of the limitations of his work: “This book was written in
a political climate of a rather speciﬁc kind, colored by the determination of a whole genera-
tion of Germans to make democracy work after all. Those historians who began their aca-
30demic work in the 1950s were especially inﬂuences by the West European and American
examples; ‘reeducation’ had left an intellectual mark on many of them. (…) These histori-
ans tended to adopt a fundamentalist conception of democracy, which emphasized its base
in the inalienable rights of natural law. (…) The writing of this book was strongly inﬂu-
enced by this trend, and it undoubtedly owes some of its strengths, but possibly also some
35of its shortcomings, to the singular intellectual constellation that existed in the Federal
Republic of Germany in the 1950s.”.
11. Cf. Weber (2012), pp. 3–94. On the formal and substantive unity of Weber’s work, see
Wolin (1981).
12. See also Schmitt (1919/1985, p. 52): “Modern philosophy is governed by a schism between
40thought and being, concept and reality, mind and nature, subject and object, that was not
eliminated even by Kant’s transcendental solution.”.
13. See also McCormick (1997, pp. 31–82).
14. For an attempt to reconstruct the “fragmented” relationship between Weber and Schmitt, see
McCormick (1997, pp. 206–12).
4515. In my short genealogical reconstruction of the word “value”, I consider only those authors
who are crucial in order to contextualize Weber and Schmitt’s positions. For further discus-
sion, see the entries “valŏur” and “valūe” in Middle English Dictionary, ed. R.E. Lewis
(Ann Arbour, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 501–3; The Oxford English
Dictionary, vol. XIX, ed. J.A. Simpson and E.S.C. Weiner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
50pp. 414–18; Dictionnaire de l’ancienne langue française, vol. X, ed. F. Godefroy (New
York: Krauss, 1961), pp. 828–9; and “Wert” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie,
vol. XII, ed. J. Ritter and R. Eisler (Basel: Schwabe, 2004), pp. 556–91. See also Volpi
(2008), which I partially follow here.
16. On Weber’s reservations concerning the term “value”, see his letters to Marianne Weber
55and Heinrich Rickert, and the “Nervi’s Fragment” in Weber (2012, pp. 374–5, 413–4).
17. Schmitt’s borrows this idea from Heidegger (1943/2002, p. 170). As a matter of fact, the
inﬂuence of Heidegger on Schmitt’s “critique of values” is crucial.
18. It is worth pointing out that in Hobbes’ system there are no clear traces of the transition
from the Good – understood as an objective fulcrum upon which to establish the Common-
60wealth – to values – understood as expression of free subjectivities. In this regards, he
writes: “I observe the Diseases of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of
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seditious doctrines; whereof one is, That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill
actions” (Hobbes, 1651/2005, p. 255).
19. Cf. the Latin edition, Hobbes (1668/1961), p. 137.
5 20. For a critical account of the Weber–Rickert relation, see Oakes (1988).
21. It is worth citing a passage of the so-called “Nervi fragment” in which Weber’s (1903/
2012, pp. 413–414) intellectual distance from Rickert is evident: “As soon as one tries to
look for something different, something objective, behind the fact that, in any given
instance, historical interest will be limited and graduated, one enters in the domain of
10 norms; that is to say: one is then looking for a principle from which it would be possible to
deduce not only what should, once and for all, be the object of our interest, but [also] to
what degree we sh[ould] graduate our interest in the various el[ements] of reality. Precisely
that is in fact the meaning – translated into everyday terms – of the ‘value metaphysics’
with which R[ickert] concludes. Here it must sufﬁce to express doubts as to the possibility
15 of grasping the substance of such norms, and simply to add that such doubts might be con-
sistent with the view that the ‘absolute validity’ of certain ‘values’ (what we would call ‘in-
terests’) could be taken to be more than simply a limiting concept. The logical possibility
of a ‘formal ethics’ at least shows us that the concept of norms [covering] the inﬁnite multi-
plicity of the object of these norms does not in itself guarantee that [such norms] can be
20 formulated in substance.” On this point, see also Bruun (2001).
22. For a similar view, see Hampel (1965), pp. 81–96.
23. It is not a coincidence that Strauss (1953, p. 53–54) uses ideal-typical examples of the
Western ethical tradition (prostitution, bravery, nobility of spirit, etc.) to develop his own
“objective criticism” of Weber’s position. Obviously, these interpretations are value-related
25 and not universal, to say the least. In this regard, it is worth quoting a passage of Heidegger
(1955/2003, p. 122–123) to clarify the question of the ratio and its alleged objective foun-
dation: “The [ratio] is by no means a just judge. It unscrupulously pushes everything not in
conformity with it into the presumable swamp of the irrational, which it itself has staked
out. Reason and its conceptions are only one kind of thinking and are by no means deter-
30 mined by themselves but by that which has been called thinking, to think in the manner of
the ratio. That its dominance arises as rationalization of all categories, as establishing
norms, as leveling in the course of the unfolding of European nihilism, provides food for
thought, just as do the concomitant attempts at ﬂight into irrational.”.
24. For similar remarks, see Weber (2012, pp. 314–15).
35 25. Cf. Weber (1922, p. 246): “[…] nur das formale Element gemeinsam, daß ihr Sinn darauf
geht, uns eben die möglichen »Standpunkte« und »Angriffspunkte« der »Wertung« aufzu-
decken.” In the English editions “Angriffspunkte” is translated either as “evaluative
approaches” (Weber, 1949, p. 144) or “points of application” (Weber, 2012, p. 157).
26. “Der Feind ist unsre eigne Frage als Gestalt./Und er wird uns, wir ihn zum selben Ende
40 hetzen./Doch aus der Volksbesonnenheit kommt Gewalt./Auf Vorgebirgen treffen sich ver-
wandte Ahnen/Und bleiben stumm, wenn Flut an Flut zerprallt.”.
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